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I. INTRODUCTION
The following is a hypothetical situation. Two friends, Julie and
Claire, applied to work at Abercrombie & Fitch, a popular clothing store.
Both girls were sophomores in college, had equivalent work experience,
had fair skin, brown hair and blue eyes, and were approximately five feet,
five inches tall. Despite their almost identical qualifications, Julie was
hired to be a sales associate at Abercrombie while Claire was not. The
reason? The hiring manager determined that Julie, who was widely
considered to be an attractive woman, fit the "Abercrombie look," while
Claire, who was of average attractiveness, did not.
Is it illegal for Abercrombie to limit their hiring practices to good-
looking people? Although there has not been a specific lawsuit against
Abercrombie for this issue, it has largely been discussed, as recent lawsuits
against Abercrombie have thrust the company's general hiring practices
into the spotlight.1 Several ex-employees of Abercrombie argue that they
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1. A class action lawsuit was recently settled against Abercrombie & Fitch alleging
racially discriminatory hiring practices. See Introduction: Discrimination Lawsuit Against
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. Settled at http://www.afjustice.com (last visited on Jan. 22, 2005)
(describing how the retailer agreed on Nov. 14, 2004 to pay forty million dollars to female,
African American, Latino, and Asian American applicants who charged Abercrombie with
discrimination); The Classic Look of Discrimination: Abercrombie & Fitch Charged with
Employment Discrimination in Federal Class Action Lawsuit (June 17, 2003) at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=55 (describing how Abercrombie refused to
hire minority applicants and, in the rare case of hiring minorities, the company forced these
employees to work in positions that kept them out of the public eye).
Even the clothing that Abercrombie requires it sales staff to wear has produced
controversy. Abercrombie was recently sued by employees in California, who alleged that
Abercrombie compelled its sales force only to wear clothing that Abercrombie was currently
selling at full price. See The "Uniform" of the Retail Employee, DILLINGHAM & MURPHY
ON THE JOB - EMPL. L. NEWSL., Aug. 15, 2003 at 2 available at
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were compelled to hire people based on their appearance - whether the
applicant would "look good" in the clothes.2 Abercrombie wanted a sales
force that effectively portrayed the image that Abercrombie was trying to
sell - "all-American" and "cool, yet seductive." 3  As a result, the less
attractive employees were either not hired, or were granted fewer hours
than the attractive employees.4 Are those employees who have suffered
appearance discrimination granted legal remedy in the American court
system?
This Comment argues that federal law should be amended to include
protections for height, weight, and appearance. It first provides rationale
for treating immutable traits of appearance as a class protected under Title
VII. Next, it examines Title VII and ADEA jurisprudence generally and
determines whether Abercrombie's alleged hiring practices are appropriate
under the current law. It then examines the civil rights laws of Michigan,
the District of Columbia, and Santa Cruz, California, which prevent certain
types of appearance discrimination. Next, using these laws as models, this
Comment describes the structure and enforcement of a law preventing
appearance discrimination. Finally, this Comment explores the difficulties
in expanding Title VII to include protections for the appearance-
challenged, and presents possible solutions to these difficulties.
II. APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION GENERALLY
An individual's appearance is often the first thing that others notice.
As such, it is a trait that is often used to judge and compare people.
5
http://www.dillinghammurphy.com/Newsletter%208-15-03.pdf (discussing Abercrombie's
2.2 million dollar settlement with the California Division of Labor Standards and
Enforcement for violating Labor Code § 450, which requires employers to pay for and
provide employee uniforms).
2. The Look of Abercrombie & Fitch (Nov. 24, 2004), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/05/60minutes/printable587099.shtml.
3. The Look of Abercrombie & Fitch, supra note 2 (describing how Abercrombie once
catered to a wealthy, mature clientele, but that it currently sells provocative clothing in an
attempt to target customers in their teens and twenties).
4. See, e.g., Monica Yant Kinney, The Hitch at A&F: It's All for 'the Look' (Dec. 7,
2003), available at http://www.philly.conmld/philly/news/columnists/7430650.htm
("Often, Burke [an Abercrombie employee] heard managers reject wannabes by saying,
'they're not good-looking enough."'); The Look ofAbercrombie & Fitch, supra note 2.
5. Society has long judged individuals based on attractiveness and appearance. See
Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the
Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2035, 2039 n.2 (1987) (citing examples
of recently abolished "ugly laws" of several major American cities, which imposed fines on
physically-deformed individuals who appeared in public places). Also, weight-based
discrimination, while a much more recent phenomenon, is just as harmful. See Elizabeth E.
Theran, "Free to be Arbitrary and... Capricious": Weight-based Discrimination and the
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 137-138
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Attractive people are generally viewed as being more intelligent, likeable,
honest, and sensitive than their less attractive counterparts.6  These
preconceived notions about appearance often develop at a very young age.7
Appearance not only affects our social interactions with others, but
impacts our ability to obtain employment. Studies have shown that
attractive people are more successful at obtaining employment than their
less attractive counterparts.8 In addition, evidence shows that attractive
individuals enjoy greater opportunities at their places of employment. 9
Appearance and attractiveness are suspect qualifications upon which
to base employment decisions and should therefore be protected from
discrimination. 10 This argument is largely based on the fact that an
(2001) (discussing how weight-based discrimination began in America at the turn of the
twentieth century, at the same time that scientific evidence began linking gluttony with
certain medical problems).
6. See generally Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit
Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 196-98 (2000)
(discussing how perceptions of appearance can impact one's social interaction as well as
one's employment potential); Facial Discrimination, supra note 5, at 2037-2038
(discussing the tendency of people to either consciously or subconsciously attribute negative
personality traits to those who are physically unattractive).
7. For example, ABC News conducted a study showing that young children had
preconceived notions of height and attractiveness. The results were as follows:
ABC News gave elementary school students a test, asking them to match a
small, medium or large figure of a man with a series of words. The kids
overwhelmingly linked the tall figure to the words strong, handsome and smart.
The [sic] linked the short figure to the words sad, scared and weak. More than
half of the kids also chose to link the short figure to the words, dumb, yucky and
no friends.
John Stossel, Lookism: The Ugly Truth About Beauty, ABC NEWS, at
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=123853&page=l (last visited on Jan. 22, 2005).
8. See, e.g., Facial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 2040 ("One of the primary
methods of assessing applicants for all levels of jobs is the personal interview, in which the
applicant's appearance is a central criterion"); Stossel, supra note 7 (describing an
experiment in which the success of attractive job applicants was compared against that of
unattractive applicants, where "[h]idden cameras captured interviewers being warmer and
friendlier to the better looking applicants and being less friendly to the other applicants").
9. See Adamitis, supra note 6, at 198 ("One study concluded that 'plain' people earned
five to ten percent less than 'average' looking people, who in turn earned five percent less
than 'good-looking' people."); Stossel, supra note 7 ("Anna Kournikova is ranked 37th in
women's tennis, and has never won a major singles championship. So, why is it that
Kournikova makes millions more dollars from endorsements than players ranked higher?").
10. See, e.g., Adamitis, supra note 6, at 196 (suggesting that states should adopt
statutory protection for appearance to protect otherwise qualified applicants and employees
from arbitrary and harmful discrimination, promote the practice of hiring and retaining
employees based solely on relevant qualifications and criteria, and assist in repairing the
inequities that result from the legitimizing of appearance discrimination in employment);
Jane Byeff Korn, FAT, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25, 27 (1997) (arguing that anti-discrimination
statutes protecting the disabled should be extended to protect the obese).
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individual is being judged regarding an immutable characteristic that does
not relate to the actual performance of the work at issue." Because
appearance discrimination has the same harmful effect as gender, racial,
religious, or national origin discrimination, it should also be prohibited by
statute. 12 Like gender, national origin, or religion, appearance should only
be considered by employers when it is found to be a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). 3
There are several arguments in favor of preventing appearance-based
discrimination. One problem with allowing employers to hire individuals
based on looks is that society will become more focused on appearance and
less focused on academic, career, or personal accomplishments. People
will compete for jobs not based on substantive factors, but on how
attractive they are. This may result in a less-accomplished workforce.
Attractiveness will be looked at as an accomplishment in itself.
Different cultures have historically held different standards for beauty.
However, as Western culture spreads to other areas, these standards of
beauty have been becoming more and more homogeneous.14  The
workplace is becoming more and more international and American
practices of preferring the attractive over the unattractive will likely spread
to these areas that are highly influenced by American culture.
III. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prevents employers
11. But see Adamitis, supra note 6 at 197-198 (discussing how some employers
consider appearance to be "a valid indicator of productivity, to the extent that productivity is
measured by personal, customer, or coworker satisfaction."); Robert J. Barro, So You Want
to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, BusINEss WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/11/b3569031.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) ("A
worker's physical appearance, to the extent that it is valued by customers and co-workers, is
as legitimate a job qualification as intelligence, dexterity, job experience, and personality.").
These arguments, which cite customer satisfaction as one justification for using appearance
as a hiring criterion, are addressed, infra Parts IV.B., VH.C.
12. See, e.g., Theran, supra note 5, at 113 (arguing that anti-discrimination laws should
be expanded to prevent weight-based discrimination); Facial Discrimination, supra note 6
at 2035 (stating that appearance, like race and gender, is almost always an inappropriate
employment criterion, and that "it is frequently used to make decisions based on personal
dislike or prejudicial assumptions rather than actual merit").
13. Adamitis, supra note 6, at 221 (stating that the consideration of appearance in
employment contexts is justified only when it is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to carry out
the job function).
14. Leela Jacinto, Ouch! Western Beauty Norms Head East: Global One Vision of
Beauty Heads East, ABC NEws, (Nov. 14, 2003), at
http://abcnews.go.com/International/print?id=84642 (describing how, as Western culture
has spread to China, India, and Africa, the beauty norms for these areas has shifted to a
taller, slimmer, and fairer standard).
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from refusing to hire or promote individuals based on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."' 5  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) extends the protection of Title VII to prevent employers from
refusing to hire or promote individuals based on age.
6
In a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must either
show direct evidence of discrimination or provide circumstantial evidence
that meets the requirements of a prima facie case. 7 Direct evidence
establishes the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was a motivating
factor for the employment action. 8 Direct evidence can include statements
made by a manager that show illegal motive in employment decisions.1 9
For example, racial slurs made by a decision-maker are sufficient direct
evidence of illegal motive to constitute a prima facie case of employment
discrimination.20
However, if the plaintiff can provide only circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, she must establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework.2' This framework requires the plaintiff in an
employment discrimination lawsuit to have evidentiary proof of the
following: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the
job in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances
supporting an inference of discrimination.22
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-( 2 ) (2000); see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 202-07 (1979) (presenting several senators' remarks that Congress's primary
concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII was the
economic disadvantages experienced by the African American population); see also
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) ("'[S]ex' under Title VII
encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences between men and women-and
gender."); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d
1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding discrimination on the basis of membership in Hopi
Indian tribe constitutes national origin discrimination).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623 (2000). "The purpose of the [ADEA] ... is 'to promote the
employment of older persons based on ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment."' Macellaro v. Goldman, 643
F.2d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
17. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358-60 (1977)
(illustrating several means through which a plaintiff can satisfy his burden in a Title VII
case).
18. Kresnak v. City of Muskegon Heights, 956 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
19. Id.
20. Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (1 1th Cir. 1985); see also LaPointe v.
United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding sufficient as direct
evidence of employment discrimination a union decision-maker's repeated negative
statements regarding older workers).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22. See id. at 802-05 (holding that, where an employer sought a mechanic, which was
the complainant's trade, and continued to do so after complainant's rejection, and employer
did not dispute complainant's qualifications, complainant proved prima facie case under
2005]
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Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant must clearly set forth reasons for its actions, which, if believed
by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination
23was not the cause of the challenged employment action. When the
employer effectively shows nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the employer's reasons are mere pretext.24
IV. BFOQ EXCEPTIONS TO TITLE VII PROTECTIONS
A. BFOQs Generally
Despite the anti-discriminatory purposes of the ADEA and Title VII,
both statutes allow employers to base hiring decisions on restricted
characteristics in certain circumstances. Title VII contains an exception
allowing an employer to base an employment decision on gender, religion,
or national origin when such a classification is considered "a bona fide
occupational qualification ['BFOQ'] reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise ... ,25 A BFOQ cannot
be based on stereotypical assumptions about a particular class.26 In order
for gender to be considered a BFOQ, the employer must have a factual
basis to believe that all or substantially all of the excluded sex would not be
able to perform the job safely and efficiently. 27  Likewise, employer
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
23. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 517 (1993) ("It is important to note, however, that although the McDonnell
Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, '[t]he ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. "'(internal citation omitted)).
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he plaintiff is 'required to show by a
preponderance of the evidence either (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2)
that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his discharge, or (3) that they were
insufficient to motivate discharge."' (internal citation omitted)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
26. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206-07 (1991)
(holding that gender was not an acceptable BFOQ where women were prevented from
working in jobs involving a high risk of lead exposure unless they could provide
documentation of infertility).
27. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (stating that sex
cannot be a BFOQ if the exception is being claimed on the basis of a stereotypical
characterization of the sexes); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that the telephone company failed to meet the burden of showing that
switchman's position came within exception to general prohibition where sex is bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to normal operation of particular business
or enterprise).
For an example of when a BFOQ involving gender was established, see Fesel v.
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discrimination against or in favor of particular religions or nationalities
cannot be based on employer preference, but must have a rational
purpose.28 In theory, employers are not allowed at all to apply the BFOQ
standard to racial characteristics.2 9 However, in practice, courts have
allowed employers to use the BFOQ exception for situations involving
race.
30
The ADEA recognizes a similar exception.31 To establish bona fide
occupational qualification defense, the employer must establish that the job
qualification is "reasonably necessary," and that "either (a) ... it had
reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all persons over the age
qualification would be unable to perform safely the duties of the job, or (b)
Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978) (holding that nursing
home met the burden of establishing a BFOQ when it refused to hire a male nurse's aide).
28. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 466-67 (9th
Cir. 1993) (striking down a school's requirement that all teachers be Protestant, because the
Protestant faith could only be considered a BFOQ with regard to religious education
instructors); Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding
that the requirement of pilot to convert to Moslem religion was a bona fide occupational
qualification, which warranted employer's religious discrimination because it reflected the
fact that non-Moslem employees caught flying into Mecca would, under Saudi Arabian law,
be beheaded).
29. Although Title VII contains BFOQ exceptions for gender, national origin, and
religion, it does not contain a BFOQ exception for race or color. See Ray v. Univ. of Ark.,
868 F. Supp. 1104, 1126-27 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (holding that the University was not justified
in terminating a white police officer solely because some of the students at the
predominantly black university were prejudiced against white officers).
30. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that, because
necessity for a black officer was shown, a county boot camp did not violate equal protection
laws when it gave preference on racial grounds to a black applicant over other white
applicants); Miller v. Tex. St. Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980) ("A
business necessity exception may also be appropriate in the selection of actors to play
certain roles. For example, it is likely that a black actor could not appropriately portray
George Wallace, and a white actor could not appropriately portray Martin Luther King,
Jr."); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 nn.10- 11 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing
examples of when it is acceptable for a police department to use race as a factor in
determining officers' assignments).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (2000). The statute reads in part,
"It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited.., where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age, or where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such
employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of
the country in which such workplace is located."
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that it is highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an
individualized basis." 32 Therefore, like the BFOQ exception in Title VII,
the ADEA exception can only be used where the characteristic is directly
related to one's ability to perform a particular job function.
The BFOQ is an affirmative defense in a Title VII discrimination
suit. 33 Therefore, in order for a BFOQ defense to apply, the employer must
allege that he or she properly made an employment decision based on one
of the protected classes. 4
B. Impact of Customer Preference
Courts have recognized customer preference exceptions in
employment discrimination cases in the areas of religion, gender, and
national origin. 35  However, this exception was intended to be extremely
limited in scope.36 Courts have held that it is generally inappropriate to
32. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 401 (1985); see also Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 130 (1985) (holding that airline violated equal
protection laws by not applying the same transfer policy for employees over sixty years-
old); Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 369 (1985) (holding
that a provision in the federal civil service statute requiring most federal fire fighters to
retire at age fifty-five did not establish that age fifty-five was a bona fide occupational
qualification for non-federal fire fighters).
33. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that in a disparate treatment case, the defendant's affirmative defense must be that
its policy, practice, or action is based on a BFOQ); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221,
1225-26 (1 st Cir. 1993) (determining that the employer must show the characteristic at issue
is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business).
34. See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 748 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (holding that an employer did not have to prove a BFOQ defense in a case where the
employer did not allege he refused to hire the plaintiff because of his national origin).
35. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1005 (E.D. Mich.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the legislature
sanctioned limited customer preference exception in employment discrimination cases in the
areas of religion, sex, and national origin, but not in the areas of race or color); Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). Specifically, the court stated:
The clear import of this legislative history is that customer preference can
provide a basis for an employer's selecting employees on the basis of their sex
where the preference is a legitimate one, related to differences in the ways in
which the work will be performed by persons of different sexes, and the manner
in which such performance will be received by the customer because of such
differences.
Id.
36. Feder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333 n.114 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("The weight of authority is that customer antipathy to members of protected groups does
not make membership in a more favored group a bona fide occupational qualification."
(alterations in original)).
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allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether
gender discrimination would be appropriate. 7  Despite the fact that the
public may be uncomfortable with a person of one gender working in a
position traditionally held by an individual of the opposite gender, this
should not prevent individuals from working in positions they are qualified
to hold.38 In addition, the pressure to appeal to an international clientele is
not sufficient to impose gender discrimination.39 "Though the United
States cannot impose standards of non-discriminatory conduct on other
nations through its legal system,... [n]o foreign nation can compel the non-
enforcement of Title VII here., 40 Likewise, courts have refused to allow
employers to base employment decisions solely on consumers' racial
preferences.4
It is appropriate for an entity to use customer interest as a clear
guideline for hiring purposes only when customer privacy is at issue42 and
when the entity is unduly burdened by a hiring decision that goes against
customer preference.43 These decisions often involve employment of
37. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Diaz
II") (stating that it would be inappropriate for a BFOQ to be based on the preferences of co-
workers, the employer, clients, or customers); Olsen v. Marriott Int'l., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1052, 1065 (D. Ariz. 1999) (recognizing that Ninth Circuit courts have rejected BFOQs
based on customer preference for members of one sex); Witt v. Sec'y of Labor, 397 F. Supp.
673, 678 (D. Me. 1975) (holding that discrimination on the basis of gender was
inappropriate, despite the fact that a beauty salon owner, whose customers preferred male
hairdressers over female hairdressers, would experience increased business if a male
hairdresser was hired).
38. See Diaz II, 442 F.2d at 389 (holding that an airline could not refuse to hire a male
flight attendant solely on the grounds that passengers preferred to be served by female
attendants); see also EEOC Decision No. 70-11 (July 8, 1969) (rejecting an unsupported
contention by an employer that he would lose customers if he hired a woman to perform the
work because the customers would feel that a woman could not provide the security needed
in performance of the work).
39. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting an
oil company's refusal to promote the female plaintiff based on the fact that its Latin
American clients would react negatively to a female executive).
40. Id.
41. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
that, in determining whether to retain a white employee, the Higher Educational Aids Board
could not consider the preferences of its clientele for African American counselors).
42. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that a BFOQ was
established on privacy grounds, where a hospital's refusal to transfer a male nurse to the
labor and delivery department was based upon concern for the female patients for privacy
and personal dignity which makes it impossible for a male employee to perform the duties
of the position effectively); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354
(D. Del. 1978) (upholding nursing home's refusal to hire a male nurse where the record
revealed that a majority of the home's residents were females who objected, on grounds of
privacy, to having their personal needs attended to by a male).
43. See Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1196-97 (holding that hospital's refusal to hire male
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health care workers who have close contact with clientele.44 In upholding
the privacy BFOQ, courts have generally focused on whether the
employment duties affect customers' physical modesty interests.
4 5
However, recent scholarship opposes the tendency of courts to focus on
modesty, favoring instead a general three-pronged test to determine
whether a privacy BFOQ exists.
46
The employer has the burden of meeting certain elements to show that
its hiring practices protect the privacy of a customer. 7 When an employer
defends a gender discrimination action by raising the privacy interests of its
customers as the basis for a BFOQ defense, the employer must prove (1)
that it had a factual basis for believing that the hiring of any members of
one sex would directly undermine the essence of the employer's business
and (2) that the employer could not assign responsibilities selectively in
such a way that there would be minimal clash between the privacy interests
of the patients and the nondiscrimination principle of Title VII.4' The
employer must also show that this customer preference actually exists and
is not just an assumption based on the gender composition of the
customers.4 9
V. DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
The protections in Title VII also extend to facially neutral
employment practices that have a discriminatory impact."' Once the
nurse was justified because adherence to the hospital's policy, which required that a second
nurse be present when a male nurse attended to a patient in the labor and delivery
department, would cause strain upon the nursing staff, an increase in hospital costs, and a
reduction in the hospital's efficiency); see also Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1410, 1417-23 (N.D. 111. 1984) (upholding employer's decision to restrict female
attendants to working in female washrooms because employer established that occupants of
the building would have objected to a member of the opposite sex entering their washrooms
during the day to perform cleaning duties, that if the procedure were instituted it would
detrimentally affect the building, and that no reasonable alternatives existed).
44. Backus, 510F. Supp. at 1196-97.
45. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposalfor Expansion of
the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 363 (2004).
46. Id. at 363-64 (suggesting that three factors be required in determining that a privacy
BFOQ exists: (1) the customer preference is for same-gender service, (2) the employment at
issue implicates privacy or therapeutic interests that are gender related, and (3) the
preference for same-gender service does not derive from harmful stereotypes).
47. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1351.
48. Id. at 1350-51.
49. See EEOC Decision No. 71-2410 (June 5, 1971) (holding that, although three-
quarters of the residents of a nursing home were female, the home's practice of only hiring
female nurses was not justified under the BFOQ exception because there was no evidence in
the record that all of the female residents of the home shared this preference).
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that an employer
cannot require high school diplomas or standardized general intelligence tests as conditions
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employee successfully shows that an employment practice results in a
discriminatory impact, the burden shifts to the employer to show that there
is a business necessity for the practice.5' Business necessity is certainly not
,,12synonymous with "convenience, and requires more than what is required
of an employer to establish legitimate business purpose.5 3 Once the
employer successfully shows business necessity,5 4 the plaintiff has an
opportunity to rebut this claim by showing an alternative employment
practice that would achieve this same business purpose.5
The business necessity doctrine is distinguishable from the BFOQ
exception in discrimination actions under disparate treatment. 6 First, the
BFOQ exception is a statutory exception applicable to overtly
discriminatory practices, while the business necessity doctrine is a court-
developed exception to the rule preventing discriminatory impact.57
Second, the BFOQ exception does not apply to racial discrimination,
whereas business necessity can apply to all types of discrimination.58
of employment where neither standard is significantly related to successful job performance,
both conditions operate to disqualify African Americans at a higher rate than white
applicants, and the jobs at issue formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of
a longstanding discriminatory hiring practice).
51. Id.
52. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 433 (5th Cir. 1971)
(determining whether the Terminal showed a business necessity in its continued use of craft
and class seniority systems, which had a disparate impact on African American employees).
53. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (rejecting the Court of Appeals' holding that
because a policy requiring a high school diploma serves the business purpose of improving
the overall quality of the work force, such policy is justified despite the discriminatory
impact against African Americans); see also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
796-98 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that business purpose is concerned with the motive behind
employment practice, whereas business necessity relates to the validity of such a practice
under Title VII).
54. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) (holding
that a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed to violate Title VII without
evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate required in a disparate treatment
case).
55. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 517 (2003) ("[Tlhe plaintiff may respond by suggesting an 'alternative
employment practice' that would achieve the employer's legitimate job-related aims as
efficiently as the challenged practice but without causing a disparate impact."); see also Lee
Franck, The Cost to Older Workers: How the ADEA has been Interpreted to Allow
Employers to Fire Older Employees Based on Cost Concerns, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1409,
1432 (2003) (discussing how the mechanism of disparate impact analysis is intended to
achieve the same anti-discriminatory purposes as Title VII and the ADEA).
56. Despite the fact that these two doctrines are distinct, courts have sometimes applied
the improper doctrine. See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 966-
68 (D. Md. 1973) (using business necessity analysis in determining whether a retirement
plan granting benefits for females to vest twice as quickly as benefits for men fell within the
BFOQ exception).
57. See supra text and accompanying notes 26, 51-57.
58. See discussion supra notes 30-31.
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Third, and most notably, the business necessity doctrine focuses on
whether the facially neutral employment practice is necessary to the
employer's business.5 Conversely, the focus in a BFOQ analysis centers
on whether the requirement of a particular gender, religion, or national
origin is necessary to the employer's business.60
VI. TITLE VII DOES NOT RECOGNIZE "APPEARANCE-CHALLENGED"
INDIVIDUALS AS A PROTECTED GROUP
As discussed above, Title VII was intended to protect employees from
discrimination based on their race, color, gender, religion, or national
origin.6' Title VII, however, was not intended to protect individuals from
discrimination based on appearance or attractiveness.6 2  As long as
attractiveness criteria are applied to different classes of people equally and
do not result in disparate impact, the practice is not actionable.63 In
addition, courts have found that employers generally have the right to
mandate reasonable dress or grooming codes, as long as these requirements
are applied equally to everyone. 64 Therefore, under Title VII, employers
are not restricted from making employment decisions based on appearance
or attractiveness.
59. See supra text and accompanying note 55.
60. See discussion supra Part IV.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
62. See Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D. Nev. 1993) ("No Court
can be expected to create a standard on such vagaries as attractiveness or sexual appeal.");
Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 117, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that although
employer's alleged act of favoring more attractive women over less attractive women was
abhorrent, it did not fall within the proscriptions of Title VII).
63. See Alam, 819 F. Supp. at 913-14 (holding that the defendant employer's practice
of hiring individuals based on their sexual attractiveness was not actionable under Title VII).
64. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) ("'As
television is a visual medium, television networks and local stations clearly have a right to
require both male and female anchors to maintain a professional appearance while on
camera."'); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-33
(7th Cir. 1979) (holding that an employer can require all employees to wear sex-
differentiated uniforms, but it cannot require only female employees to wear uniforms);
Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding an
employer's requirement that all male employees keep their hair short and neatly trimmed);
Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that
the defendant employer did not have to provide evidence showing the "business necessity"
for having a dress code that prevented women employees from wearing pantsuits); Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated on other grounds,
567 F.2d 429 (1979) (holding that an airline cannot require only female employees to wear
contact lenses).
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A. Requirement that Violation Must be Against a Protected Class
In order for an individual to successfully argue appearance
discrimination, this discrimination must also be in violation of a class
protected by Title VII. Most often, these allegations touch upon either
discrimination by gender or by national origin, and involve either
attractiveness, height, or weight.
Gender-plus discrimination (also referred to as "sex-plus"
discrimination) can be alleged when one experiences gender discrimination
plus another type of discrimination. 65 In order to demonstrate gender-plus
discrimination, the plaintiff must argue that the employer's actions were
motivated by gender.66 In these circumstances, employees can successfully
bring forth appearance discrimination suits. 67 However, in situations where
sex discrimination cannot exist, appearance discrimination is not
actionable.68
Discrimination based on height and weight can be argued by members
of a protected gender or national origin class. Generally, it is a violation of
Title VII to deny equal opportunity to persons who, as a class, tend to fall
below national norms for height, where height is unnecessary to the
performance of the job in question. For example, unnecessary height
requirements are violative if they have a disproportionate effect on smaller-
built ethnicities, such as Hispanics. 69 In addition, these height requirements
70
violate equal protection rights if they disproportionately impact women.
65. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)
(holding that disparate treatment of a subclass of a protected group violates Title VII).
66. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The vitiating sex
factor... stemmed not from the fact that what appellant's superior demanded was sexual
activity.., but from the fact that he imposed upon her tenure in her then position a
condition which ostensibly he would not have fastened upon a male employee."); Tomkins
v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) ("It is only
necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the
plaintiff 'had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner."'); King v.
Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65, 68 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 778 F.2d 878 (1985)
("[E]mployers may not explicitly apply different indicia of personal attractiveness to burden
one gender more than the other.").
67. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Sexual stereotyping
through discriminatory dress requirements may be benign in intent, and may offend women
only in a general, atmospheric manner, yet it violates Title VII.").
68. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 117, 122 (holding that when a female
employee is in competition with only other women, an employer may choose a better-
looking woman and not violate Title VII).
69. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't. Inc. v. CSC, 431 F.
Supp. 526, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that evidence established that the 67-inch minimum height requirement of a police
department had a racially disproportionate impact and was not job-related).
70. See Vanguard Justice Soc'y Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 710-11 (D. Md.
1979), decision supplemented, 592 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1984) (finding a prima facie case
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However, discrimination based on height is only violative of Title VII
when a protected class has been infringed upon.7'
In addition, weight discrimination exists where there is violation of a
protected class. For example, an employer violates Title VII protections if
he or she enforces a minimum weight requirement in a disparate fashion,
making exceptions for men, but not for women.72 However, weight
discrimination alone is not protected under the language of Title VII.
73
B. Permissible Discrimination Against Job Applicants Based on
Attractiveness
Under current federal law, Abercrombie's alleged practice of
restricting its hiring to only attractive people is lawful. As long as
Abercrombie respects the protections of Title VII and the ADEA, it is
allowed to employ its sales force based exclusively on attractiveness.
Abercrombie can even base its decision on height or weight, as long as
equal burdens are imposed on all protected classes.74
However, Abercrombie's hiring strategy would be unlawful if it
violated classes protected by Title VII or the ADEA. For example,
Abercrombie's practices would be violative of Title VII if it blatantly
required high physical standards for women, but did not require these
of sex discrimination under Title VII where plaintiff's evidence showed that city police
department's height-weight requirement excluded from consideration for employment
ninety-five percent of female population between ages of eighteen and seventy-nine and
only thirty-two percent of male population of the same age, and where police
commissioner's own testimony indicated that his decision to promulgate height-weight
requirement was primarily motivated by concern about having short women serve as police
officers, and thus, plaintiff established discriminatory purpose and presented prima facie
case of sex discrimination under civil rights statute governing civil actions for deprivation of
rights).
71. See Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that a minimum height
requirement did not constitute sex discrimination where it was used to select employees
from an all-female hiring list, and Title VII did not provide a remedy since the sexes were
not in competition).
72. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that United Airlines' practice of using one set of weight tables for female flight attendants
but another for male attendants was violative of Title VII, absent a showing that its use of
different standards was a BFOQ); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98, 100 (W.D.
Ky. 1973),judgment modified on other grounds, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that
although a 150 pound minimum weight requirement was neutral on its face, it had
discriminatory impact upon women seeking to be employees).
73. Although weight is not a protected class under Title VII, obesity is considered a
protected disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
(2000).
74. See 29 A.L.R. Fed. 792, § 2 (stating that height and weight requirements are
discriminatory only if they have disparate impact on groups protected in Title VII).
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standards for men.75 In addition, if Abercrombie refused to hire applicants
who they feel are "too old" for the brand, the company would be in direct
violation of the ADEA.76 Moreover, plaintiffs can potentially make
disparate impact claims if these attractiveness requirements inadvertently
impacted protected classes.77
VII. STATE LAWS PROHIBITING APPEARANCE-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DECISION CAN SERVE AS A MODEL FOR FEDERAL LAWS
Some jurisdictions have laws specifically banning appearance from
being considered in employment contexts. Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Act
(the Elliot-Larson Act) explicitly prevents discrimination on the basis of
height and weight.7" The District of Columbia Human Rights Act goes
even further by also preventing discrimination on the basis of appearance.79
Also, an ordinance passed by the City Council of Santa Cruz, California
bans employment decisions based on physical characteristics.8 0 These laws
and their application by the courts can serve as models for changes to Title
VII.
A. Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act
The Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act prevents an employer from
discriminating on the basis of "religion, race, color, national origin, age,
sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status."8' Although the Act
does not directly address the issue of attractiveness, it is important because,
unlike Title VII, it explicitly addresses issues of height and weight, which
are factors of appearance.82 As under Title VII claims, in order to recover
under the Elliot-Larson Act, the claimant must either show direct evidence
of discriminatory animus or show circumstantial evidence that meets the
75. Frank, 216 F.3d at 853.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. (2000). But see Franck, supra note 55, at 1434-36
(discussing how employers use the business necessity rule to circumvent ADEA regulations
preventing employers from discriminating based on age).
77. See discussion supra Part V. While this is true of actions under Title VII, it is
undecided whether disparate impact can be argued in claims under the ADEA. The
Supreme Court will be deciding this issue in the upcoming year in the case of Smith v. City
of Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 1724 (2004). Oral arguments were held on November 3, 2004. Id.
78. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2102 (2004).
79. District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.11 (2001).
80. Santa Cruz, Cal., Mun. Code § 9.83 (1992), available at
http://www.genderadvocates.org/policy/Ordinances/Laws/Santa%20Cruz (last visited Jan. 5,
2005).
81. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2102.
82. In addition, unlike Title VII, the Elliot-Larsen Act protects individuals on the basis
of marital status. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2102.
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requirements of a prima facie case. 3 If the plaintiff produces direct
evidence, he or she is not required to make a prima facie case. 4 However,
if the plaintiff can only provide circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell
Douglas framework must be adhered to.
85
In order to recover, the plaintiff must show either through direct
evidence or a prima facie case that height or weight discrimination is a "but
for" cause of his or her termination. 86 "[T]he Michigan Supreme Court
made clear that the appropriate inquiry is whether [the employee's]
termination would have occurred even if the Defendants had not considered
[height or] weight. '8 7  If termination would have occurred regardless of
weight or height, the plaintiff cannot recover. However, the plaintiff does
not need to prove employer discrimination against his or her height or
weight was the sole reason or even the main reason for discharge.8
At first glance, the protections of the Elliot-Larson Act may seem very
similar to those granted by Title VII. Federal courts applying Title VII
requirements have ruled in favor of claimants arguing discrimination of
height and weight.8 9 However, these federal cases have required that the
claimant show membership within a group explicitly protected by Title VII,
usually gender, race, and/or ethnicity.' ° Michigan's statute, however,
83. See discussion supra Part III.
84. Lamoria v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 584 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff, who was able to show direct evidence of discrimination by
employers, was not held to the burden-shifting analysis of the McDonnell Douglas
framework).
85. Id.
86. See Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
truck driver failed to establish prima facie case of weight discrimination because he
presented no evidence connecting his employer's alleged prejudice against overweight
individuals with the decision to terminate him, and no evidence showing that the driver's
replacement weighed less than him); Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115, 1125
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (applying Michigan law) (holding that the clear preponderance of the
evidence, including a personnel file with numerous references to plaintiffs behavioral
problems and comparatively few references to her weight, shows that plaintiff's termination
would have occurred regardless of her weight).
For an example of direct evidence sufficient to support a claim for weight
discrimination, see Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 595 (detennining that plaintiffs presentation of
evidence, including affidavits of several employees stating that the manager expressed
hostile views toward overweight individuals and testimony that the manager forced several
other overweight individuals to resign, was sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff
was discharged on the basis of her weight).
87. Ross, 687 F. Supp. at 1125 (internal citations omitted).
88. See Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 286, 291-92 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding
that, although plaintiff need not show that weight discrimination was the sole reason for his
discharge, plaintiff failed to show any connection between alleged weight discrimination
and the termination of his employment).
89. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
90. Id.
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expands this protection, forbidding discrimination based on height and
weight even when the claimant is not a member of a Title VII protected
class.9'
The Elliot-Larson Act, like Title VII, allows exceptions for bona fide
occupational qualifications.92 The BFOQ exception in these cases applies
when the defendant presents sufficient evidence showing that a height or
weight requirement was reasonably necessary to the ordinary operation of
business.93 For example, in Ross v. Beaumont Hospitals, the court held that
it was reasonable for a fact-finder to dismiss the defendant's claims that
weight fell within the BFOQ exception.94 Although the defendant hospital
produced evidence including doctors' testimony that plaintiffs weight
prevented her from wearing the appropriate sterile gowns, the plaintiff
countered that these same doctors continued to work with her in the
operating room.95 In addition, plaintiff produced the testimony of several
doctors stating that excessive weight did not prevent physicians from
reaching into the depths of patients' wounds.96
B. The District of Columbia Human Rights Act
Although the Elliot-Larsen is quite progressive, it still does not
specifically address discrimination based on an individual's appearance or
attractiveness. Conversely, the District of Columbia recently enacted a
statute, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (D.C. Act), explicitly
prohibiting appearance-based discrimination, in addition to prohibiting
discrimination based on height, weight, and all classes of Title VII.97
Specifically, the Act prevents employers from discriminating on the basis
91. See Micu v. City of Warren, 382 N.W.2d 823, 828 ("In [Dothard v. Rowlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977)], the height and weight requirements were disallowed because of their
disparate impact upon a protected class, i.e., females. In Michigan, height itself is the
protected characteristic.").
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2208 (2004) ("An employer may have a bona fide
occupational qualification on the basis of religion, national origin, sex, age, or marital status,
height and weight without obtaining prior exemption from the commission, provided that an
employer who does not obtain an exemption shall have the burden of establishing that the
qualification is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.").
93. See Micu, 382 N.W.2d at 828 (requiring that the case be remanded to determine
whether the proposed height requirement was reasonable to ensure the proper and efficient
running of a fire department).
94. Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115, 1124-25 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (2001). The
D.C. Act prevents discrimination based on based on "the actual or perceived: race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation,
family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of any
individual .... Id.
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of "personal appearance," which the Act defines.98 The purpose of the D.C.
Act is to protect from employment discrimination those who may not fall
into the protected classes of Title VII. 99
Actions under the D.C. Act mimic those actions brought under Title
VII with respect to the allocations of burdens of proof.1°° As in Title VII
actions, plaintiffs in actions under the D.C. Act always maintain the
ultimate burden of proof in establishing unlawful discrimination
practices."
An example of this burden-shifting can be seen in Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights,10 2 where the
D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's finding that the plaintiff,
Elisa Janetis, was discriminated against by her employer, ARCO, on the
basis of her personal appearance. At the Commission's hearing, the
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
discrimination. Specifically, Janetis showed that, although her clothes
were similar to that of other similarly situated employees, she was singled
out by ARCO for her appearance and behavior. Upon shifting the burden
98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (2001). The D.C. Act defines "personal appearance"
as follows:
[T]he outward appearance of any person, irrespective of sex, with regard to
bodily condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner or style
of personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and beards. It shall
not relate, however, to the requirement of cleanliness, uniforms, or prescribed
standards, when uniformly applied... to a class of employees for a reasonable
business purpose; or when such bodily conditions or characteristics, style or
manner of dress or grooming presents a danger to the health, personal welfare,
or safety of any individual.
Id.
99. The purpose of the D.C. Act is as follows:
Aware that there were certain classes of persons whose characteristics placed
them at a disadvantage in some segments of the labor market, e.g., persons with
physical handicaps, unprepossessing appearance, homosexual proclivities, or
burdensome domestic obligations, the Council decided to add persons thus
afflicted as well as others to the list of categories protected against employer
disfavor.
Nat'l Broad, Co., Inc. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 463 A.2d 657, 661-62 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
100. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing how the plaintiffs burdens of proof for actions under the D.C.
Act are the same as those required in actions brought under Title VII); see also McManus v.
MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 955-57 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff
failed to meet the burden of proof when she failed to show evidence that her manager's
comments about her appearance were malevolent, and failed to produce evidence that she
was replaced by a candidate with a more favorable appearance); discussion supra Part III.
101. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 A.2d at 1099.
102. Id.at 1101.
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to the defendants, the Commission found that ARCO's claim that Janetis
violated standards of appropriate office attire was a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.' °3 After the burden shifted back to
Janetis, the Commission found that she properly showed that ARCO's
claims were merely pretextual by providing evidence that her appearance
was similar to that of her coworkers. Ultimately, the court of appeals
upheld the Commission's finding that ARCO's complaints focused much
less on the appropriateness of Janetis's work attire than on her physical
structure and cost of the clothes in question."°4
Despite the D.C. Act's prohibition of appearance discrimination,
employers can regulate employees' appearance in certain circumstances.
The Act does not apply to appearance regulations that require cleanliness,
uniforms, or prescribed standards.'05 In order to fall within the "prescribed
standard" exception, the employer must demonstrate (1) that there actually
exists a prescribed standard; (2) that this standard is uniformly applied to a
class of employees; and (3) there exists a reasonable business purpose for
the prescribed standard.
0 6
In order for prescribed standards to be acceptable, they first must be
sufficiently specific.0 7  Unwritten standards do not suffice.0 8  These
regulations need not expressly state every appearance-based rule of the
employer; so long as the interpretation is a reasonable and foreseeable
interpretation of the policy, it is appropriate.' 9 For example, the D.C.
Court of Appeals found it appropriate for an employer to prohibit males
from wearing ponytails, even though the written policy did not expressly
prevent the hairstyle."0 The employer's "no ponytail" rule was acceptable
because it was universally applied and was a reasonable and foreseeable
interpretation of its written requirement of a "neat hairstyle.""'.
103. Id. at 1100. However, the Court of Appeals also noted the Commission's finding
that ARCO failed to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination because it
did not have "a uniformly prescribed standard of dress applied for reasonable business
purpose." Id.
104. Id. To illustrate its point, the Court of Appeals included the following statement
made by the Commission: "'the nature of Morgret's criticism of the complainant's personal
appearance manifests a preoccupation with the complainant's physique and the cost of her
clothes.' The character of the criticism progressed from comments about articles of attire to
the comparison of her conduct with that of a prostitute." Id.
105. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (2001).
106. Turcios v. U.S. Servs. Indus., 680 A.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also
Kennedy v. Dist. of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding a fire
department's grooming policy discriminatory because it was not universally applied).
107. Turcios, 680 A.2d at 1027.
108. Id.
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As stated above, for an employer to regulate appearance, prescribed
standards must be uniformly applied and intended to promote a reasonable
business purpose. 1 2 For example, in Kennedy v. District of Columbia, the
fire department prohibited firefighters from growing beards.'1 3 However,
there was an exception for men who had a skin condition, pseudofolliculitis
barbae (razor bumps), because allowing the beard to grow is the most
effective treatment for curing these lesions.' 14 The department maintained
that the restrictions were put in place for reasonable business purposes:
safety reasons with respect to the breathing apparatus as well as for morale
purposes." 5 However the department failed to produce sufficient evidence
to show that well-trimmed beards would prevent the breathing apparatus
from working properly." 6 In addition, the court found that because the rule
was applied inconsistently and improperly, it was regarded as "silly" by the
firefighters, and thus failed to achieve its purpose of boosting morale." 7
Although the court struck down this particular appearance regulation, it
stressed that the department was free to develop a similar regulation
limiting facial hair growth so long as it was universally applied."
18
Like Title VII and the Michigan Statute, the D.C. Act contains an
exception to these protections, stating that an employer may use practices
that have discriminatory impact on one of the protected classes only if the
discrimination is unintentional, and if it is required by business necessity." 9
Business necessity requires that an employer would be unable to carry out
its business without using the specific employment practice.'2°  "[A]
'business necessity' exception cannot be justified by the facts of increased
cost to business, business efficiency, the comparative characteristics of one
group as opposed to another, the stereotyped characterization of one group
as opposed to another, and the preferences of co-workers, employers,
customers or any other person.'1
21
The business necessity exception differs from the reasonable business
purpose standard listed above. First, the business necessity exception
applies to all classes protected by the D.C. Act, while the reasonable
112. Kennedy v. Dist. of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 851.
114. Id. at851 n.1.
115. Id. at 854-55.
116. Id. at 855-56.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 856-57.
119. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2503(a). The business necessity exception states, in part
"[a]ny practice which has a discriminatory effect and which would otherwise be prohibited
by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be established that such practice is not
intentionally devised or operated to contravene the prohibitions of this chapter and can be
justified by business necessity." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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business purpose standard applies only to those individuals claiming
appearance discrimination. 22  Further, the reasonable business purpose
standard applies only to cases where the employer has shown that the
discrimination was the result of a prescribed standard.
23
C. Santa Cruz Ordinance
In 1992, the Santa Cruz City Council approved an ordinance intended
to prevent discrimination based on "height, weight, physical characteristic,
or sexual orientation" among other classes cited in Title VII protections.
24
When this statute was first proposed, it was intended to prohibit
discrimination based on "personal appearance.' ' 125 However, in a location
where many young adults took intentional and extreme steps to alter their
image, the public responded harshly to the notion that personal appearance
should be protected. 2 6  In response, the legislature quickly altered the
language of the ordinance to prevent discrimination against physical
characteristics specifically, and not prevent discrimination against personal
appearance generally. 27 The language specifically protects individuals on
the basis of characteristics that are derived from birth, accident, or
disease.
2 8
122. See Turcios v. United States, 680 A.2d 1023, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing
the differences between these two concepts).
123. Id.
124. Santa Cruz, Cal., Mun. Code § 9.83.010 (1992). The intent of the ordinance is "to
protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to be free from all forms of
arbitrary discrimination, including discrimination based on age, race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, gender, sexual orientation, height,
weight, or physical characteristic." Id.
125. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
126. The public responded by deeming the law the "purple hair ordinance" or the "ugly
ordinance." Id. In addition, the following appeared in an article in the Washington Times:
Out in Santa Cruz, Calif., the weirdos are on the march double time. The City
Council is considering enacting a law that would forbid discrimination on the
basis of personal appearance. As a result, every geek in the country seems to be
flying, flapping, crawling or hopping into town to squeak and gibber in support
of this measure. If it passes next month, the city's population may soon
resemble nothing so much as the cast of a 1950's drive-in horror movie....
Linda H. Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476,
498-99 (2000) (citing Santa Cruz' Weirdocracy, WASH. TiMEs, Jan. 21, 1992, at F2).
127. Post, supra note 125, at 6.
128. "Physical characteristic" is defined in the statute as:
a bodily condition or bodily characteristic of any person which is from birth,
accident, or disease, or from any natural physical development, or any other
event outside the control of that person including individual physical
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The Santa Cruz ordinance contains a "reasonable business purpose"
exception, similar to that in the D.C. Act. 129 However, use of this exception
is not justified "based upon the comparative characteristics of one group in
contrast to another, or a stereotyped characterization of one group in
contrast to another."'
130
VIII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT FOR PREVENTING APPEARANCE
DISCRIMINATION
A. Expansion of Title VII
Title VII should be expanded to recognize appearance as a protected
class.' 3 1 It has been argued that attempts to amend Title VII would be
futile; that creating state laws would better achieve the goal of preventing
appearance discrimination. 32 However, reliance on state laws to attack the
problem of appearance discrimination is unlikely to yield uniform results.
For example, although an unattractive person may be protected from
employment discrimination in the District of Columbia, this person would
not be protected in Michigan unless the alleged discrimination relates to
height, weight, or Title VII protections."' Thus, if individual states are
solely responsible for preventing appearance discrimination, citizens in
certain areas are unlikely to receive equal protection, if any protection at
all.
Although courts have noted that Title VII was not meant to protect
mannerisms. Physical characteristic should not relate to those situations where
a bodily condition or characteristic will present a danger to the health, welfare
or safety of any individual.
Santa Cruz, Cal., Mun. Code § 9.83.020(13) (1992).
129. Id. at § 9.83.080(1) ("[a]ny practice which has a discriminatory effect and which
would otherwise be prohibited by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be
established that the practice is not intentionally devised to contravene the prohibitions of
this chapter and can be justified by a reasonable business purpose.").
130. Id.
131. It has also been posited that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) should be
expanded to include the appearance-challenged. See Facial Discrimination, supra note 5, at
2042-43 (discussing how protection for appearance can be found in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (the precursor to the ADA)). For reasons against expanding the ADA to include
this group, see Adamitis, supra note 6, at 216 (stating that the ADA would not provide
sufficient protection because most victims of appearance discrimination would not fall
under its requirements: employers would not view the unattractive as disabled, and
individuals would have a difficult time showing substantial impairment).
132. See Adamitis, supra note 6, at 218-19 (citing the difficulties of expanding Title VII
to include appearance as a protected class).
133. See discussion supra Part VII (noting how the laws of Michigan, District of
Columbia, and Santa Cruz provide different levels of protection for their citizens).
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individuals with respect to appearance, courts have generally aimed this
criticism at protection of mutable traits, not on immutable ones.'14 As the
court in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. stated,
Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when
employers are barred from discriminating against employees on
the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national
origin.... But a hiring policy that distinguishes on some other
ground, such as grooming codes or length of hair, is related more
closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than
to equality of employment opportunity.135
Based on this argument, it remains a possibility that Title VII protections
may one day be expanded to include another immutable trait: appearance.
In addition, the fact that appearance-challenged individuals have faced
significant discrimination, especially in the employment context, means
that they should be protected by federal law. 36 However, because the
unattractive do not constitute a coherent, readily identifiable unit, there has
been less desire to alter Title VII to include this group. Commentators
have argued that because, as a class, the unattractive have not experienced
the type of discrimination as other classes protected by Title VII, legislators
would be loath to expand federal law.'37 However, these arguments neglect
two key points. First, the unattractive actually have faced systematic
discrimination in the United States. Several cities once enforced "ugly
laws," which prevented disabled, physically maimed, or very unattractive
people from appearing in public. 3 8  It is certainly true, though, that
134. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that, except with
respect to religion, Title VII focuses mainly on characteristics that are beyond the victim's
power to control); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1975) ("Hair length is not immutable and.., enjoys no constitutional protection. If the
employee objects to the grooming code he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for
employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate his preference by accepting the
code along with the job." (emphasis added)).
135. 507 F.2dat 1091.
136. See discussion supra Part II.
137. See Adamitis, supra note 6, at 219 (recognizing a "clear distinction" between the
historical experiences of those currently protected by Title VII from those who suffer from
appearance discrimination); Karl V. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the
Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 337, 355 & n.10l (1982) (proposing that protection
for the overweight should be contained in a separate statute, rather than an amendment to
Title VII, because the overweight have not faced a history of purposeful discrimination like
that faced by Title VII classes).
138. See supra text and accompanying note 5. "People who are regarded as unattractive
are, for example, perhaps the only noncriminal, noncontagious group in America ever to
have been barred by law from appearing in public." Facial Discrimination, supra note 5, at
2035.
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appearance discrimination has never risen to the level of racial
discrimination in United States history. Nonetheless, because the effects of
appearance discrimination likewise impair individuals' employment
opportunities (as discussed supra Part H), appearance should be a protected
trait under Title VII.
Second, these commentators' arguments point out differences between
appearance and other traits protected by Title VII, without recognizing that
differences also exist between traits within Title VII coverage. For
example, racial discrimination is fundamentally different from gender
discrimination, in that there exist actual biological differences between the
male and female genders that do not exist between different racial groups.
However, although the characteristics of, and resulting discrimination
against, gender are different from the characteristics of, and discrimination
against, race, both traits are protected under Title VII. Federal law
accounts for the difference in these traits and the prejudice against these
traits by prohibiting race, but not gender, from being used as a BFOQ.
Therefore, federal law has adjusted to the different needs of the Title VII
classes. Likewise, just because discrimination against appearance works
differently than prejudice against traits protected by Title VII does not
mean that appearance should not be protected. Instead, lawmakers should
include appearance as a protected trait under Title VII, in recognition that
appearance discrimination, as with other types of prejudice, impairs
employment opportunities.
B. Requirement of Immutability
The proposed law would protect the immutable aspects of appearance.
Each of the state and local laws mentioned above protect immutable traits
relating to appearance, but not those within the direct control of the
individual. For instance, Michigan recognizes height and weight as
protected traits, disregarding altogether the gray areas inherent in
preventing "appearance discrimination."' 3 9 In addition, the Santa Cruz
ordinance specifically states which types of physical traits are unacceptable
bases for an employer to consider. 4 ' Although the D.C. statute
theoretically protects mutable characteristics, in practice this protection is
much weaker.14 ' Employers are free to regulate mutable characteristics so
long as the regulation is part of a written policy, applied uniformly, and
performed to achieve a reasonable business purpose.
142
139. See discussion supra Part VII.A. Although it is arguable whether weight is truly an
"immutable" characteristic, this Article considers it as such.
140. See supra text and accompanying note 128.
141. See discussion supra Part VII.B.
142. Id.
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Not all aspects relating to appearance should be protected in a work
environment. A statute protecting all aspects of appearance-especially
those including self-expression-would be contradictory. Essentially, if an
individual chooses to alter his appearance to express himself, how is it
proper to force an employer to ignore this individual's choice of self-
expression? 43 Imagine the public outcry against such a law.' 44 Instead, it
is appropriate to protect individuals from discrimination based on
characteristics that are immutable, so long as these qualities are not
necessary to the performance of the job at issue.
In addition, if the aspect of appearance is to be placed on par with the
other protected classes of Title VII, it is important that only immutable
traits are considered.'45 Protection for Title VII classes is based largely on
the fact that certain persons experience discrimination through no fault of
their own. 46 These individuals are born with characteristics that place
them at a disadvantage in the workplace and elsewhere. Therefore,
granting protection for appearance traits that are fully within the control of
the individual will undermine the entire purpose of Title VII.
C. Disparate Treatment
If these protections are to be embedded within Title VII, courts will
use the same analysis in determining whether an employer has engaged in
appearance discrimination. Essentially, the same burden-shifting
requirements will exist, placing the ultimate burden of proof on the
plaintiff. 47 However, the plaintiffs ability to effectively prove her case is
complicated by the subjective nature of attractiveness and appearance.
Attractiveness and unattractiveness cannot be objectively measured.
This differs from the qualities of other classes protected by employment
law, which can be objectively measured. The issue of whether a person
belongs to a particular protected class is usually fairly straightforward; the
question of whether an individual belongs to a particular race, sex, or
national origin is not open to nearly as much interpretation. Even certain
143. Post, supra note 125, at 5 ("The theme of self-expression.., rests on the seemingly
paradoxical notion that persons have the right both to use their appearance to communicate
meanings, including messages of 'threat,' and simultaneously to require others to ignore
these messages.").
144. See supra text and accompanying note 126.
145. Although religion is not truly immutable, it is protected under Title VII possibly
because "religion was originally seen as a status, like race and sex, and the problem of
discrimination based upon belief or religious needs was not well thought through." Steven
D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and
Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 741 (1996).
146. See discussion supra Parts II, VIII.A.
147. See discussion supra Part III.
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aspects within the realm of appearance can be objectively measured. For
example, even though different people have different opinions as to what
the "ideal weight" for the human body should be, the medical community
has issued general guidelines categorizing people based on weight.
1 48
Therefore, there is an objective range in which most people consider
individuals to be overweight or of normal weight. In contrast, the
guidelines determining attractiveness are not as clear, and they rely on a
number of different factors. 49 In addition, different people and different
cultures have different opinions on what they perceive beauty to be. 5°
These issues of enforcement and subjectivity are especially important
when considering how an employee alleging appearance discrimination is
going to overcome her burden of proof. This problem comes into play
mainly when an individual is only able to provide circumstantial evidence
to support her case. 5 ' The subjectivity inherent in the qualities of
attractiveness and appearance is problematic in proving employment
discrimination via the McDonnell Douglas framework. This problem of
subjectivity is especially apparent in steps one and four of the test. How
can one show that he or she is a member of a class of "unattractive
people"? Further, how can one prove that the position at issue went to a
person or persons who are not part of this class? Arguing appearance
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework would essentially
put the courts in the position of judging the parties' looks, not the validity
of their legal arguments.
Although the subjectivity inherent in attractiveness seems
problematic, courts are accustomed to making similar rulings. Courts have
ruled on subjective areas in many types of cases, including those in tort,
copyright, and trademark law.152 For example, one area in tort law that has
148. Body Mass Index Calculator, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/bmi/calc-bmi.htm (last
reviewed Dec. 16, 2004) (outlining categories for the body mass index, the ratio between
weight and height: a BMI under 18.5 is underweight, a BMI between 18.5 and 24.9 is
normal weight, a BMI between 25 and 30 is overweight, and a BMI over 30 is obese).
149. BeautyCheck, at http://www.uni-regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/phil-Fak II/
Psychologie/PsyII/beautycheck/english/index.htm (last modified Sept. 6, 2003) (describing
attractive faces as generally having clear skin, symmetry, and averaged features).
150. See Meg Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 221,
229 (1994) (describing how different cultures have distinct preferences in "height, weight,
and prominence of features").
151. This issue of subjectivity is not as problematic when an employee is able to provide
direct evidence of appearance discrimination. In these circumstances, the employee can
sufficiently meet her burden if she provides evidence that an employer has made statements
disparaging the employee's appearance, which served as a motivating factor in the
employee's discharge. See discussion supra Part HI.
152. See Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, an
Unworkable Decision, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 318-19 (2004) ("[T]here is nothing
inherently wrong with making subjective judgments; judges and juries make them often.
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received criticism for its inherent subjectivity is a court's application of the
supposedly objective "reasonable person" standard.'53 Subjectivity is also
inherent in situations where fact-finders attempt to determine whether an
author's work is original enough to be copyrighted. 5 4  In addition,
trademark infringement liability is based not on actual confusion, but a
more subjective "likelihood of confusion" standard. 55 Therefore, although
judging a claimant's looks would be a task laced with subjectivity, courts
are accustomed to this type of analysis.
In light of the fact that courts are accustomed to handling subjective
issues, the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework for proving
appearance discrimination is not as daunting as it first seems. Therefore,
plaintiffs alleging appearance discrimination under the proposed law will
be able to meet their initial burden of proof by presenting either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Under the proposed law, if the allegations against Abercrombie of
"lookism" are true and Abercrombie admits to them, the company is likely
to argue that attractiveness is a BFOQ. The company would probably
maintain that it must limit its hiring to attractive people, because they
represent the Abercrombie brand more effectively than their less attractive
counterparts. People will want to buy Abercrombie clothes because the
clothes look good on the sales force. In addition, many of these sales
representatives attend local high schools and colleges. If these students are
attractive, it is likely that they will draw other students in from those
schools to purchase the clothing. Therefore, hiring attractive people is a
good marketing strategy - one that is likely to bring Abercrombie greater
profits than hiring average-looking people.
However, in order for appearance to be a BFOQ, the employer must
show that the ability to carry out the necessary tasks lies solely with
attractive people. In the context of the Abercrombie salesperson, it is
highly difficult to argue that only an attractive person is capable of
performing these job responsibilities. For example, the Abercrombie
What is dangerous is failing to recognize subjectivity and appropriately constraining it.").
153. See, e.g., Larry A. Dimatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 293, 294-95 (1997)
("How can the use of the objective reasonable person be reconciled with the subjective,
discretionary nature of judicial decision-making?").
154. Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a "Question of Law" or a
"Question of Fact": The Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 181-82 (1999)
(advocating the position that determination of originality is a "question of fact" because
originality is an inherently subjective issue).
155. K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion
Doctrine - Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 609, 620 (2004) (discussing how likelihood of confusion is based
largely on similarity of appearance, determined by three characteristics: sight, sound, and
meaning).
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website lists the qualities they are looking for in a "Brand Representative."
"We're looking for Brand Representative[s] who have the following: an
eye for quality and style; an appreciation for the A&F lifestyle: cool,
casual, classic and fun; high energy and an interest in interacting with
people-the ability to have fun."' 156 This job description fails to mention the
necessity of hiring attractive people. In addition, the attractive and
unattractive alike are capable of performing basic salesperson tasks:
stocking shelves, greeting customers, and operating a cash register.
Under the proposed amendment, customer interest and preference
could not be used in this scenario by Abercrombie to justify hiring
individuals based on their looks. As mentioned in Part IV.B. above,
customer preference can only be taken into account when doing otherwise
would render the employer unable to perform the primary function or
service it offers. 57 Therefore, an employer can base his decision to hire an
individual based on a customer's perception of attractiveness if, and only if,
that particular line of work requires an individual to look a certain way.'58
For example, the careers of models and actors are directly dependent on
how they look; therefore, employers in these fields have greater range in
using appearance in employment decisions.'5 9
D. Disparate Impact
Protections against appearance discrimination can also come into play
in a disparate impact context. For example, it is alleged that Abercrombie
had a policy requiring all employees to wear their brand-name clothing
during all work hours. 6 However, because Abercrombie clothing is only
made in a particular set of sizes, overweight and obese individuals may not
be able to fit into the clothing. Thus, although this policy is neutral on its
face, it could potentially prevent certain people (i.e., overweight
individuals) from obtaining or continuing employment.
If accused of violating the proposed law, Abercrombie may attempt to
argue business necessity in this case. The business necessity rule requires
156. Jobs, Abercrombie & Fitch, at http://www.abercrombie.com/anf/lifestyles/html/
jobs-stores-part.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
157. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1971).
158. See, e.g., Ford Modeling Agency web site, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.fordmodels.com/content.cfm?content-id=6&client_id=&client_email= (last
visited on Jan. 22, 2005) ("What if I'm not tall and slim? Even if shorter models have found
success in the modeling industry, these few represent the exception to the rule. Clothing for
runway shows and magazine shoots tends to come in one size. If you can't fit into a
designer's garments, you will face difficulty in finding work.").
159. See Facial Discrimination, supra note 5, at 2046 (discussing how exceptions to
appearance discrimination rules would apply to models and actors, "who perform clearly
appearance-related work").
160. See The "Uniform" of the Retail Employee, supra note 1.
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that in order for an employer to factor appearance into its hiring decisions,
appearance must be a necessary component of the job. 16' For example, in
this case, if Abercrombie is confronted by evidence that the uniform
requirement disparately impacts a certain class of employees, Abercrombie
must show that this uniform requirement is necessary to the operation of
the business. It is unlikely that this requirement would be acceptable under
the proposed law.
However, Abercrombie may successfully argue that a uniform
requirement is necessary in the marketing and promotion of the product.
62
In response, the plaintiff may be able to show that there exist alternative
methods for carrying out this proposed purpose. One alternative method
would be to split the duties of salesperson and model: one group could
perform sales tasks, while another group could model the clothing.
Therefore, although it would be entirely appropriate for Abercrombie to
enforce "prescribed standards" of cleanliness and presentation (as in the
D.C. Act), the proposed law would likely prohibit Abercrombie from
requiring its sales force to wear its own brand-name clothing.
IX. THE DIFFICULTIES IN ADMINISTERING AN APPEARANCE-BLIND
SYSTEM
Aside from the difficulties presented in the legal enforcement of this
proposed amendment, cultural issues also work to prevent protection of
appearance. Many people view attractiveness as a personal
accomplishment; they assume that individuals can control the way they
look. This viewpoint becomes more reasonable in light of the wide
assortment of products and services available that promise to beautify, to
slim, and to refresh one's looks. 163 For example, plastic surgery, which was
once considered available only to the wealthy and famous, is now available
to the public at large.16' In addition, the availability of gym memberships is
at an all time high.165 Also, the number of makeup products and anti-aging
161. Primus, supra note 55, at 507.
162. See discussion supra Part V.
163. For examples of the wide assortment of cosmetics and skin care products see Estee
Lauder's web site, at http://www.esteelauder.com/index.tmpl?ngextredir=l (last visited Jan.
22, 2005); Lancome's web site at http://www.lancome.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2005);
Clinique's web site, at http://www.clinique.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
164. How to Get High Quality, Cheap Plastic Surgery!, ESCAPEART1ST.COM, at
http://www.escapeartist.com/e_Books/Cosmetic-Surgery.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005)
(advertising a book written by JoAnn M. Roselli describing how regular people can get
access to safe, affordable plastic surgery).
165. See Eric Harr, How to Pick the Perfect Gym, THIRD AGE, available at
http://thirdagemedia.com/news/archive/ALT02030418-01.html?taloo (last visited Jan. 22,
2005) (stating that, as of 2003, "[olver the past decade, the total number of health club
members has increased a whopping seventy-six percent, from 17.4 million to 30.6
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serums continues to grow, as the public (especially women) continue to
purchase them.166 Even height, which at one time was only altered by an
individual's choice of footwear, is not truly considered an immutable
characteristic anymore. A new surgical procedure has been developed to
make people taller by a few inches. 67  With all the cosmetic products,
services, and techniques on the market, it is not surprising that people
generally view one's attractiveness to be attributed less to fortuitous
genetics than to one's desire to become more beautiful. Thus, the line
between mutable and immutable characteristics becomes blurred, making it
more difficult to draft and enforce laws targeted at protecting appearance
traits that are immutable.
In addition, it is difficult to separate pure attractiveness from other
mutable characteristics that determine how well a person will perform on
the job. For example, it makes sense that an employer would want to hire
an individual with good eye contact, an inviting smile, and a well-fitting
suit.168 These traits may speak to an individual's desire to have a job, and
how well that person will perform in the position. However, it is difficult
to determine how much these traits can be attributed to personal choice,
versus how much they are attributable to one's attractiveness.
Although it would be favorable for individuals to obtain employment
based solely on their achievements and accomplishments and not on their
looks, this is a very daunting task. An individual's appearance is often the
first thing that is noticed by others, making it a difficult characteristic for
them to ignore. Moreover, the concepts of beauty, attractiveness, and
appearance are so ingrained in members of our culture that it would be a
difficult task to remove them altogether from the hiring process. However,
laws prohibiting employment discrimination would not force employers to
be blind to the appearance traits of employees and prospective hires - this
would be an impossible task to require. Instead, protections for appearance
million.").
166. Robert D. Springer, Springer Journal: $87 Billion For Iraq And Afghanistan!.,
WRAL.cOM, at http://www.wral.com/fayettevillenews/2504138/detail.htm (posted Sept.
23, 2003) ("Americans spend about $75 billion each year on cosmetic products."); Larry
Lindsey, Iraq Costs Require Some Perspective, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2003-09-21-lindsey-x.htm (posted Sept.
21, 2003) ("We spend about 0.7% of our money on cosmetic products. In other words, our
combined operations to combat terror in the Middle East cost a bit more than we spend on
makeup and shampoo...").
167. Jacinto, supra note 14 (describing how, in order to make themselves a couple of
inches taller, some Chinese women are undergoing debilitating surgery, which involves
sawing one's tibia just below the knee with a metal apparatus of levers and nails forcing the
bone apart until it regenerates and heals).
168. See How to Dress, Joblnterview.net, at http://www.job-interview.net/howto
dress.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (describing how prospective employers determine a
candidate's qualifications largely by the candidate's dress and non-verbal signals).
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should, like other Title VII protections, compel the employer to recognize
that, although certain differences exist, these differences do not constitute
sufficient grounds on which to base hiring decisions?69
On a final note, the difficulty of implementing appearance-blind
protections should not serve as a barrier to this much-needed reform. In the
recent past, our society has created statutory protection against
discriminatory practices based on race, gender, religion, and national
origin, despite the difficulty in doing so.17
X. CONCLUSION
Although Title VII effectively protects several classes of individuals
against employment discrimination, it does not currently extend this
protection to those who suffer appearance-based discrimination. Title VII
must be expanded to prevent appearance-challenged individuals from
suffering employment discrimination. Although the task of imposing
appearance-based protections seems difficult, it is important to ensure that
employment is obtained through hard work, not good looks.
169. See Theran, supra note 5 at 135 ("[W]hile antidiscrimination law cannot and should
not blind us to one another's appearances, it should require us to think very carefully about
what criteria actually matter before making decisions that discriminate against others ... ").
170. See Adamitis, supra note 6 at 222-23 (discussing how the enactment of Title VII
challenged widespread societal notions of the classes it was intending to protect).
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